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Introduction 
It is impossible to repair or replace the graphite core of an AGR, and therefore the 
graphite core is one of the main components that determine the operational life of a 
nuclear station.  The reactor core is composed of hundreds of hollow graphite bricks.  
The graphite ages because of neutron irradiation and radiolytic oxidation causing 
distortion and potentially cracking of the bricks towards the end of reactor life. 
Monitoring the integrity of the core is undertaken on a routine basis during planned 
station outages.  These outages occur roughly every three years and result in a large 
volume of detailed information from a few selected channels (normally eight) collected 
by a Channel Bore Monitoring Unit (CBMU).  This data consists of accurate measures of 
the channel bore diameter and tilt angles.  The information from these few channels is 
used to provide an overall assessment of the health of the core.  Gathering this detailed 
information is time consuming due to a number of factors: 
• The channel being inspected must be emptied of fuel prior to monitoring, in order 
for the monitoring device to be inserted into the channel, 
• To capture the level of detail that is required, the monitoring device is raised very 
slowly through the entire length of the reactor.  This can take several hours. 
• Once the monitoring is complete, the fuel needs to be reinserted into the channel. 
This process needs to take place during a station outage, when the reactor is off-line.  
While the reactor is off-line, it is not generating electricity.  Therefore, it is important that 
the reactor is not off-line for any longer than is necessary.   
 
In addition to the detailed data gathered during the outages, data is also gathered during 
routine refuelling operations.  Height and load measurements are taken during refuelling 
and are used for control and protection purposes.   
 
It has been proposed that this routine refuelling data could be interpreted to provide 
additional information relating to the presence of cracks within the reactor core, thus 
supporting the safety case for the continued operation of the station.  Manual 
interpretation of this data would be too laborious and time consuming so an automated 
approach utilising Intelligent System (IS) techniques is described in the remainder of this 
paper.  A number of Intelligent Systems techniques utilise encoded expert knowledge to 
reason about a particular situation in order to provide the same conclusion as a human 
expert, given the same set of inputs.  The main IS technique discussed in this paper is 
rule-based reasoning, which uses expert knowledge in the form of rules to derive a 
conclusion. 
 
To summarise, there are two sets of data available that can provide information relating 
to the condition of the graphite bricks within the reactor core: 
• A low volume of very detailed channel information from a small number of 
channels.  This data is gathered during planned station outages, which occur every 
few years.   
• A high volume of less detailed information relating to height and load of a fuel 
assembly during a refuelling event.  Refuelling events take place on a weekly 
basis. 
The aim of this research is to utilise IS techniques to interpret this high volume of lower 
quality data in order to drive out additional information relating to the condition of the 
reactor core.   
 
Previous work in this field has seen the application of IS techniques to support the 
analysis of fuel assembly set-down during reactor core refuelling [1].  The developed 
ALTA system, employs three techniques, K-means clustering, C4.5 rule induction and 
Kohonen networks to identify and classify features of interest within the data.  A majority 
voting system involving the three techniques increases the confidence in the results and 
provides redundancy should one of the techniques fail.  Diagnostic rules elicited from 
fuel route engineers and implemented in ALTA are used to provide an assessment of 
whether the fuel assembly has seated satisfactorily or if there is a situation that requires 
further analysis, such as a fuel ledging within the channel.  This work demonstrated the 
applicability and practicality of IS techniques for data interpretation relating to the core.  
It also proved that such IS applications can be justified for safety-related implementation. 
 
Background to Nuclear Refuelling 
Refuelling a power station reactor is an ongoing process and the refuelling of individual 
reactor channels takes place on a regular basis, with around 60 to 70 refuelling operations 
annually.  A refuelling operation consists of removing the old fuel and fuel assembly 
from a channel, moving it to storage for future reprocessing, and inserting new fuel and 
fuel assembly into a channel.  During this refuelling process, data relating to height and 
load of the fuel assembly is recorded.  Engineers interpret this data to ensure that the fuel 
has been correctly inserted into the reactor and has settled correctly on the support stool 
at the bottom of the reactor.  This height and load data is captured on a pen and paper 
plotter, although the newer stations also capture this data electronically.  In addition, 
there is a programme in place to fit most of the remaining stations within the UK with 
electronic data capture devices.   
 
Currently no routine examination of this refuelling data is undertaken for the purposes of 
graphite brick crack detection.  Manual interpretation of this data has been performed on 
an ad-hoc basis and is a time consuming process, which requires a significant amount of 
expertise.  The individuals with this expertise do not have the time to spend manually 
examining all the load traces that are produced during refuelling.  Therefore, to reduce 
the burden placed on these experts, methods of automatically interpreting this data using 
intelligent system techniques are being investigated.   
 
Graphite Core Construction 
The core of a nuclear reactor is constructed from hundreds of interlocking cylindrical 
bricks of graphite.  Each brick is hollow, and a number of bricks, normally eleven, are 
stacked on top of each other, leaving deep channels the length of the core into which the 
fuel is inserted.    A simple diagram of one reactor core brick is shown in figure 1.  Due 
to the heat and radiation that the core is subjected to during operation, individual bricks 
can distort and may eventually develop cracks over time [2].   
 
Figure 1: Diagram of graphite core brick 
 
Fuel assembly exchange A	  fuel	  assembly,	  which	  holds	  the	   fuel	  used	  to	  generate	  the	  heat	  within	  the	  reactor	  core,	   is	   inserted	   into	   the	   fuel	   channel	   during	   refuelling.	   	   This	   is	   not	   a	   single	   solid	  device,	   it	   consists	  of	   four	  sections	  separated	  by	   telescopic	  and	  compression	   joints.	  	  The	  sections	  are:	  the	  gag	  unit	  which	  seals	  the	  fuel	  assembly	  into	  the	  fuel	  channel;	  an	  upper	   plug	   unit	  which	   contains	   the	   biological	   and	   heat	   shields;	   a	   lower	   plug	   unit	  containing	   the	   radiation	   shield	   and	   the	   fuel	   stringer	   for	   housing	   the	   nuclear	   fuel.	  	  Two	  sets	  of	  brushes,	  one	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	  assembly,	  and	  one	  at	  the	  top,	  guide	  the	  fuel	  assembly	  down	  the	  channel	  into	  the	  core	  of	  the	  reactor.	  	  These	  brushes	  set	  up	  a	  frictional	  interface	  with	  the	  wall	  of	  the	  reactor	  channel.	  Interfaces	  between	  adjacent	  brick	   layers	  result	   in	  changes	  to	  the	  bore	  diameter	  of	  the	  channel.	   	  As	  the	  brushes	  pass	   through	   these	   features,	   there	   is	   an	   equivalent	   change	   in	   the	   frictional	   forces	  between	  the	  walls	  and	  the	  brushes,	  which	  correspond	  to	  an	  apparent	  change	  of	  load	  on	   the	   fuel	   assembly.	   	   This	   change	   in	   load	   manifests	   itself	   as	   peaks	   within	   the	  refuelling	   load	   trace.	   	   Figure	   2	   shows	   a	   sample	   load	   trace,	   with	   the	   peaks	  representing	  the	  brick	  layer	  interfaces	  highlighted	  on	  it.	  	  Other	  known	  features	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  peaks	  or	  sets	  of	  peaks	  within	  the	  load	  trace.	  	  A	  set	  of	  peaks	  caused	  by	  the	  fuel	  assembly	  passing	  through	  a	  restriction	  in	  the	  fuel	  channel	  is	  also	  highlighted	  on	  figure	  2	  as	  the	  upper	  stabilising	  brush	  passing	  through	  the	  piston	  seal	  bore.	   	   In	  addition,	  certain	  types	  of	  brick	  crack	  will	  also	  appear	  as	  a	  peak	  in	  the	  load	  trace.	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Figure 2: Example load trace for removal of a fuel assembly from the core illustrating 
the brick layer interfaces 
 
Types of crack 
This work focuses on two of the major types of brick cracking that can occur in a reactor 
core, early life cracking and primary cracking.  Early life cracking occurs 
circumferentially and its appearance on a load trace plot is a peak, similar to that of a 
brick layer interface.  Primary cracking occurs when a brick splits from top to bottom, 
which results in an increase in bore diameter of the brick as it separates at the crack.  This 
corresponds to a step change in load across the brick layer with the crack, which can be 
detected in the load trace.  Though brick cracking sounds serious, the design of the 
reactor core and keying system allows safe operation of the reactor to be continued in the 
presence of brick cracking.  It is, however, very important to be aware of the nature and 
location of any cracking within the core. 
 
Refuelling trace analysis 
In order to demonstrate that reactor core brick cracking could be detected from the load 
trace produced during refuelling a number of channels containing known cracks were 
examined.  The CBMU data was compared with load trace data from each refuelling 
event associated with that channel.  Figure 3 shows the comparison between a load trace 
and a CBMU trace of bore diameter of the channel.  Due to the effects of radiation, areas 
of a graphite core brick will shrink at different rates, leaving the top and bottom of the 
brick channel narrower than the middle.  This effect can be seen on the CBMU trace in 
figure 3 with the reduction in channel diameter towards the interfaces between brick 
layers.  Due to the large volume of data, it would be impractical to undertake a manual 
examination of the data for each refuelling event for evidence of brick cracking.  The 
automation of load trace data analysis through the use of IS techniques could provide 
useful additional information relating to core integrity.  The remainder of this paper 
describes a proposed system for the automatic detection of brick cracking from routine 
refuelling event data. 
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Figure 3: Comparison of a channel bore monitoring unit trace of channel bore diameter 
and a refuelling load trace from the same channel. 
 
Intelligent Crack Detection System 
The key activities undertaken within the crack detection intelligent system are shown in 
figure 4.  The load trace data is fed into the system where initial data validation is carried 
out.  This ensures that a refuelling event, as opposed to an on-line plug unit (OLPU) 
insertion event, is being examined and that the data is of suitable quality.  The next stage 
is to extract the data relating to the region of interest, namely the core region containing 
the brick-layers, and discard the unnecessary data.  The core region data is then examined 
for peaks, as these are used to identify the locations of the brick layers within the load 
trace.  Peaks in the data can also indicate the presence of cracks within the core.  Once 
the peaks have been identified, they are classified as either brick-layer interfaces, other 
known features, potential cracks or noise.  Rule-based techniques are then employed to 
analyse the resulting conclusions to determine the likelihood of a crack being present in 
the channel.  Following this analysis, a report summarising any findings is produced and 
the results of the analysis archived.  At this stage of the research, the data validation, data 
preparation and peak identification modules have been demonstrated, using data from a 
single station.  
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Figure 4: System description showing the key modules required for graphite brick layer 
crack detection 
 
Data Validation Module 
The data validation module ensures that the data refers to the refuelling process, as 
opposed to the insertion of a control device such as an on-line plug unit (OLPU) and that 
the data is not corrupt.  This is an important stage of the analysis as the knowledge used 
in the feature classification module assumes that a standard fuel exchange event is under 
examination.  Multiple elements are used to assess the file, namely: 
• Size of the data file.  A refuelling operation normally takes about an hour to 
complete.  As the data is recorded at a constant rate, the channels are the same length 
and the speed of the hoist is consistent, the size of the resulting data file should also 
be consistent between refuelling operations.  Events, such as re-seating of the fuel or 
delays in the fuel exchange process can prolong the refuelling operation and therefore 
result in a larger file.  This may need to be factored into any future analysis. 
• Date and time of refuelling.  Occasionally the refuelling event may be split across two 
files.  If there is another refuelling file for the same channel within a 30 minute time 
period from the first, this can indicate such an event.  When this occurs, the two files 
will need to be combined into a single file for analysis 
• Maximum, minimum and average values of load and height.  These statistical 
measures can indicate data corruption or loss of signal. 
• Shape of refuelling trace.  A human can quickly identify events involving OLPUs 
from the overall load trace.  An equivalent measure can be obtained by assigning each 
data point to one of four value bands and examining the points where the data changes 
from one band to another. 
 
These elements are formatted into a set of rules that are applied to any new trace, to 
ascertain whether it is suitable for further analysis.  These rules include supporting 
evidence used to justify any outcomes of the analysis to the user at the reporting stage of 
the system.  An example rule relating to the file size is shown below. 
 
If File Size < 620000 (bytes) then Non-standard refuelling event 
 
Supporting Evidence:  699 traces from over a 7-year period were 
examined. The smallest standard refuelling operation file examined so 
far is file xxxx_yyyy (reference to smallest file) at 694341 bytes.  
The limit for this rule has been set lower than this value to allow a 
margin of error.  It is assumed that a file of less than 620000 bytes 
will not refer to a standard refuelling operation, as no evidence of 
such an event has been encountered to date. 
 
This supporting evidence can then be returned to the user if the rule is fired during 
analysis, providing a more complete explanation than an ordered list of the rules fired.  
This approach will also benefit the maintenance of the system, by providing an auditable 
trail of the knowledge used by the system to make its decision.  For example, consider the 
situation where a data file of 610000 bytes relating to a standard refuelling operation was 
presented to the system.  Without the supporting evidence, the output from the analysis 
would be restricted to: 
 
File is a Non-standard refuelling event (If File Size < 620000 (bytes) then Non-
standard refuelling event) 
 
Though this provides an explanation as to why the file is non-standard, it provides no 
explanation as to how the rule was defined when the system was constructed.  With the 
supporting evidence, the user would be aware of the reason for setting the limit and could 
propose that a revision to the rule be made.  This is important in software within a safety-
related domain, such as nuclear power generation, as clear and transparent justification is 
provided for any decisions made. 
 
The rules are stored using an XML format to allow them to be parsed and read by a user 
in a web browser.  The same file is used by the intelligent system to perform the 
diagnosis.  This ensures that a single common set of rules is used and maintained. 
 
A key question arising from this is how much explanation to offer the user.  Too little 
explanation then the user may distrust the result provided by the system.  Too much 
explanation and the user may be overwhelmed.  This issue will be investigated further 
during the course of this research. 
 
Data Preparation Module 
Data is recorded throughout the entire refuelling process, however, the data of interest 
corresponds to the fuel assembly passing through the graphite brick layers in the core.  
This occurs twice during refuelling, as the old fuel assembly is removed from the core 
and as the new fuel assembly is inserted into the core.  The analysis focuses primarily on 
the fuel assembly removal as, due to the physical interactions between the fuel assembly 
and channel wall, features such as brick layer interfaces and cracks are more prominent.  
The data relating to fuel insertion is not discarded but used to provide corroboratory 
evidence for the location of features of interest. 
 
This module requires the start and end points of the region relating to the graphite brick 
layers to be identified.  The height signal can be used to determine the start and end 
points of the data as the height of the core is constant and will not change over time.  In 
addition, a distinct set of peaks appears in the load trace as the stabilising brushes pass 
through the piston seal bore.  This feature can be used to corroborate the height data, or 
can be used as an alternative should the height signal be unavailable. 
 
Peak Identification Module 
As described earlier, both early-life cracks and brick layer interfaces manifest themselves 
as peaks within the load trace.  In order to automatically identify these peaks from the 
data a peak identification algorithm is required.  Once all the peaks within the load data 
have been identified, each peak is classified as either: 
• A brick layer interface 
• A known physical feature within the channel, such as a brush passing the piston seal 
bore 
• A potential crack.   
 
The following outlines the peak identification algorithm: 
 
Get Data 
Repeat the following until no data is left 
 
Read in load data point (x) 
If x > (x-1) 
• Values still increasing (no turning point reached) 
If (x-1) – (x-2) > 0 and x < (x-1) 
• Turning point (peak) identified 
• Store point (time, load) and peak start point (time, load) in array 
Count peaks in array 
If greater than acceptable number and smoothing limit has not been reached 
• Perform smoothing operation 
• Report smoothing operation 
• Return to start using smoothed data 
If 3 smoothing operations have been carried out 
• Report limit has been reached 
 
Proceed to peak classification 
 
The data is then reversed and the algorithm re-applied.  The two arrays are then compared 
for common peaks that are over a predefined length and height.  This ensures that the 
major peaks, which correspond to the features of interest, rather than the smaller peaks, 
which are caused by noise, are identified.  If the number of major peaks exceeds an upper 
limit of suspected peaks, the data is smoothed and the above procedure of peak 
identification is repeated.  If there are still too many peaks after a third smoothing 
operation, the analysis continues, but a comment is added to the final report. 
 
Identifying the brick layer interfaces permits the average load across the brick layer to be 
calculated.  Values that fall outside a pre-defined limit can indicate the presence of  the 
second type of crack, primary brick cracking.  This module is still in the early stages of 
development. 
 
Classification Module 
Following the identification of all the peaks within the load trace, each peak needs to be 
classified in order to identify those peaks referring to brick layer interfaces or other 
known features and those which may relate to cracks within the core.  The approach 
adopted is to firstly identify those peaks relating to the brick layer interfaces, followed by 
those caused by other known features within the channel, such as the upper stabilising 
brushes of the fuel assembly passing the piston bore seal.  Finally, the remaining peaks 
are examined to determine whether the peaks are likely to have been caused by a crack in 
the brick.   
 
In order to identify the brick layer interfaces within the load trace, each peak is examined 
in relation to its absolute position (from height measurements) and its relative position to 
the other peaks identified.  The height of each brick layer remains constant, therefore the 
relative distance between adjacent brick layer interfaces on the load trace should also 
remain constant.  This information is used to identify the set of peaks most likely to 
correspond to the brick layer interfaces.  In addition, there are a few peaks that 
correspond to known physical features within the channel.  Knowledge about the location 
of these features and their associated shapes within the trace are used to identify the 
peaks relating to these features.  This information is currently being developed as a set of 
rules, similar to those described in data validation, to be implemented in a rule-based 
system.  Each rule also contains an associated rationale used to provide an explanation of 
the analysis at the reporting stage of the system.   
 
Once the peaks relating to known features have been identified the remaining peaks need 
to be examined to see if they result from a crack.  In order to determine the likelihood of 
a crack, a number of factors are considered, namely: 
• Historical data – does this peak appear in earlier refuelling events on this channel? 
• CBMU data – has detailed channel bore monitoring been carried out on this channel 
and if so, was there any evidence of brick cracking within this data? 
• Simulated crack profiles – a number of data profiles of cracked bricks are being 
generated through a full-size experimental rig.  These data profiles will be compared 
with the actual data to look for possible matches. 
 
Care must be taken when classifying each feature so that mis-classification does not take 
place.  Mis-classified cracks may result in a decision to undertake CBMU analysis on that 
channel, which could prolong an outage.  Therefore, proper justification for identifying a 
peak resulting from a crack must be given. 
 
Primary Brick Crack Detection 
Once all the brick layers have been identified, the average load across each brick layer 
can be calculated.  These values can be compared to known values for uncracked brick 
layers in order to determine whether primary brick cracking has occurred.  This module is 
currently under investigation as the process of primary brick cracking is not yet fully 
understood. 
 
User interface and reporting results of analysis 
The user will be able to select any completed refuelling operation in order to perform 
crack detection analysis on it.  The system will perform the analysis and automatically 
produce a report highlighting any potential cracks identified through the analysis.   
 
The report will consist of a summary page detailing any potential cracks.  This will be 
supported through plots of the data, indicating the features on the trace that are suspected 
cracks.  The user will then be able to select any of these potential cracks and view the 
supporting evidence for the analysis.  This supporting evidence will be in the form of a 
list of any rules that applied to the data, and the order they were executed in, with the 
option to view the original rule definition with rationale.  Each stage of the analysis 
process, from data validation to crack identification will be reported upon.  This will be 
supported through evidence from historical data, through reports from previous analyses, 
and CBMU data where available.  Finally, access to the original raw data will also be 
made available, should the user wish to perform any further, manual analysis on the data. 
 
This report will allow the engineer to identify potential cracks within the reactor core 
during routine plant operations, rather than waiting until an outage.  This will provide a 
more complete view of the reactor core by supplementing the existing, highly detailed, 
analysis carried out during an outage on a limited number of channels, with a broader, 
less detailed but more complete view through the use of routine refuelling data. 
 
Conclusions and future work 
This paper has described a proposed system for analysing routine load trace data for 
evidence of core graphite brick cracking.  This system leverages existing data and data 
capture methods and supports the detailed analysis undertaken during an outage.  This 
system offers a more complete and up-to-date view of the reactor core as refuelling is 
undertaken on a much more frequent basis than channel bore monitoring.  This additional 
information could also be used to target areas of interest during an outage, though this 
may impact on the existing process of channel selection, which is designed to ensure that 
a set of channels which is representative of the whole core are chosen.  An automated 
approach to the data analysis is required due to the volume of data involved.  In addition, 
an explanation of any output produced by the approach is required, due to the safety-
related nature of the domain.  Both of these requirements can be met by the application of 
IS techniques.  Future work will result in the development of a prototype IS system that 
will automatically interpret the load trace data from a single station.  This will then be 
expanded to include interpretation of data from other nuclear generating stations. 
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